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### **IMAGINED COMMUNITIES. BEYOND THE TERRITORIAL-TRAP**

The present paper will endeavor to elucidate the contradictions and difficulties in the determination of one's cultural identity due to the complexities raised by compression and expansion of borders and spaces. It will do so by trying to elicit some of the difficulties postcolonials (mostly Maghrebis and more particularly Moroccans) face up to in their daily negotiation of identity. Tracing up such difficulties, would lead us to necessarily anchor our discussion within host spaces where Maghrebi immigrants huddle, this would necessarily lead us to speak about France, Belgium and Holland where large numbers of immigrants live and work. So, the purpose is to survey all the literature on the topic with a view of bringing forth basic factors that presumably can help determine what community Postcolonials – and more specifically these people – think they belong to (their imagined community) in the face of systems like law, economy, religion, language, so volatile as a result of the changes in the border/space/time compression. In the view of Helmig and Kessler, the factors mentioned above escape the notion of territoriality and reconnect us on a global level offering thus a new term to negotiate identity within a world polity (Kessler and Helmig, 571).

As ex-colonised subjects – particularly in<sup>1</sup> exile – immigrant people negotiate their identity on a daily basis within their host space. There is need to stress, perhaps, that in the view of the laws governing immigration something we will come to in details in the folds of this work – very little difference exists between the postcolonial subjects living in France (or Spain) with which we have a colonial past and those living in both Belgium and Holland with which we have no history of coloniality. The urgency of the matter – identity construction – come from the fact that the last decade or so, France and a large number of European countries have offered a dual nationality to immigrants

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<sup>1</sup> Exile refers here to all those people living in France, Belgium Holland, Spain and elsewhere.

and their progeny raising thus an old issue, sanctioned by a rejection on the part of Late King Hassan II – although he later supported it<sup>2</sup> – and how challenging this notion of identity it is for the Moroccan laymen. The position of the King in this case was seconded by that of the U.S which was reported as having “frowned on its citizens carrying more than one passport”, but they turn a blind eye on it today.<sup>3</sup> In fact, even the US Supreme court supported the dual nationality as is clear from the following:

Dual nationality is the simultaneous possession of two citizenships. The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that dual nationality is “a status long recognized in the law” and that “a person may have and exercise rights of nationality in two countries and be subject to the responsibilities of both. The mere fact that he asserts the rights of one citizenship does not without more mean that he renounces the other”, *Kawakita v. U.S.*, 343 U.S. 717 (1952).

It is not in my capacity to speak of any debates such a move from the EU may have raised in the host countries, among the concerned population, but recent debates show that some EU members states are trying to grapple with the fact that some of their cabinet member have a dual nationality. The cases of the Turkish Nebahat Albayrak and Abutaleb who have been asked to renounce their Turkish and Moroccan nationality is edifying and causing much controversy.<sup>4</sup> The current King Mohamed VI has fervently spoken against any attempt to strip Moroccans in the Netherlands of their dual nationality.<sup>5</sup> Given this heated debate by Morocco and the Netherlands, it seems that some ‘cosmopolitan citizenship’ is bound to spread throughout the world following in the pace of the global capital that is breaking all imagined boundaries.

Upon consulting some of the literature on this topic, it is possible to say that there are several ways of looking at the issue, one of which is to see it as a question of choice based on personal convictions be they philosophical, ethnic, economic, religious or other. The other possible line of approach would tend to see the issue as belonging to the realm of political science with more emphasis on the legal side of the matter. In the folds of this work, the attempt would be to start with the generalities on the issue, and move into the pure theoretical debate initiated by prominent geopoliticians and jurists.

<sup>2</sup> See Interview given by late King Hassan to *Le Monde*.

<sup>3</sup> See Taso Lagos, “Global Citizenship- Towards a Definition” on 15<sup>th</sup> February, 2009 at <http://depts.washington.edu/gcp/pdf/globalcitizenship.pdf>

<sup>4</sup> See “Growing opposition to dual nationality”, *Dutch News* 02/04/2007 [http://www.ex-patica.com/nl/news/local\\_news/growing-opposition-to-dual-nationality-38318\\_34972.html](http://www.ex-patica.com/nl/news/local_news/growing-opposition-to-dual-nationality-38318_34972.html)

<sup>5</sup> On instructions from King Mohammed VI, Dutch Ambassador to Rabat Sjoerd Leenstra was called in to meet with the Moroccan ministers of justice and foreign affairs on Monday (July 7th) to express the king’s “astonishment” and “categorical rejection of any policy, whatever its origins, motivations or purposes, which would demand that Moroccan nationals living in the Netherlands renounce their original nationality.” See “Morocco Decries Move by Netherlands to Eradicate Dual Nationality” 2/18/2009 at Published on *Magharebia* [http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en\\_GB/features/awi/features/2008/07/09/feature-01](http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/features/2008/07/09/feature-01)

It would be inconceivable to start talking about imagined communities without paying tribute to Benedict Anderson who coined the term as the following quotation shows:

Benedict Anderson defined a nation as “an imagined political community [that is] imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”. An imagined community is different from an actual community because it is not (and cannot be) based on everyday face-to-face interaction between its members. Instead, members hold in their minds a mental image of their affinity. For example the nationhood you feel with other members of your nation when your “imagined community” participates in a larger event such as the Olympics. As Anderson puts it, a nation “is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion”. Members of the community probably will never know one another face to face; however, they may have similar interests or identify as part of the same nation. The media also create imagined communities, through targeting a mass audience or generalizing and addressing citizens as the public.<sup>6</sup>

The conception of an imagined community, according to B. Anderson, is not and cannot be seen as that community one can see and identify with very easily, because of proximity, physical or other, or because of clearly defined affinities. It can be inferred that such a conception also opens the door wider, than Benedict could have imagined, to include new conceptions of possible imagined communities which result from the every changing realities of communities worldwide. It is in this sense that we see Korhonen's<sup>7</sup> (2006) conception as very much illustrative of the game of identity construction that community members get engaged in. Although the example he uses is very much restricted to reader communities, one can easily see that the mechanisms leading to the formation of identities (readers of the same text) are exactly the same ones involved in the construction of national identities. Indeed, we start as individuals to become groups of individuals to end up in a community of individuals. In other words, we start as singularities to become pluralities. The examples of the literary texts creating all forms of communities is edifying to that effect:

Lovers and friends come together, reading groups meet, fan clubs are founded, discussion groups flourish on the Internet, book-crossing creates unexpected encounter, etc. In theatre, drama texts are transformed into shared experiences where singularities become a multitude, an audience. In schools, children are taught to love – or if not to love at least to respect – the ‘national literature’, the canon of those authors that have become the emblems of a nation's cultural identity. In literature departments, young students analyse texts in small groups, identifying themselves, little by little, as belonging to the community of ‘intellectuals’ or; ‘scholars’. And literature travels to

<sup>6</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imagined\\_communities](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imagined_communities), accessed on 6<sup>th</sup> November, 2009

<sup>7</sup> See Kuisma Korhonen, “Textual Community: Nancy, Blanchot, Derrida” *Culture Machine*, Vol. 8, (2006), 14<sup>th</sup>, February, 2009 at <http://www.culturemachine.net/index.php/cm/article/viewArticle/35/43>

other media, creating new kinds of communal identities. In Hollywood film industry, manuscripts are produced in order to teach us to identify with a certain life-style so that we might join those who consume the same cultural products as the rest of the world, the obedient citizens of the new Empire. (Korhonen, 2-3)

Creating communities means creating boundaries as the case may be with those who read specific books like the *Bible* or the *Quran* or Marx or *Mein Kampf* and who try to protect their own ideological space from the threats of the others. The example he offers to show how texts can create boundaries is couple with the one where he shows how they break these boundaries to bring people from different parts of the world together:

The potential of a literary text to survive seems to be determined by its ability to produce new readings that challenge the values of previous interpretive communities. Texts that once were used in order to construct common identities are, a few generations later, read in order to debunk them. Textual encounters do not only create communities but challenge them, make them unstable, and unpredictable. This may sometimes lead to the collapse of former institutions and to the birth of new interpretive communities, sects and institutionalised identities. (Korhonen, 3)

In the light of this definition of how communities are made up and unmade, one can illustrate very clearly how we conceive of ourselves as being subjects and members of a community. In the case of the immigrant or home communities, we are about to deal with, the same scenario takes place. For immigrants are both singular and plural, singular as individuals who have the choice, or not to opt for the host nation's naturalisation – a choice that may be done on an individual basis – but they are plural after their choice is made; they swell the ranks of people who queue up to obtain legal naturalisation status before the French or Belgium 'Prefectures'.<sup>8</sup> By joining these ranks of the naturalised they blur some borders and create others. In fact, even in espousing a French, Belgium, Dutch or Spanish nationality these immigrants are plural in their motivations much as they come to this venture for different and individual reasons as each of them interprets this status in his/her particular way. In so doing, they blur the very bonds they have in common with each other in seeking that political status and become singular again. They are singularly plural because they can side up with the community of origin or with the host one; but they are singular because their situation is unique. In fact, they are different from the community of origin, but also from the host one. They are in-between.

This philosophical gymnastic, engaged in this part of the work seems to blue very much the debate we wanted to open with regard to the issue of "imaginary community" construction that people get engaged in, and more particularly for us in this work, the postcolonial subjects and the immigrant communities in exile. Suffice it to remind ourselves that the debate started here is

<sup>8</sup> Prefecture is a French word for the City Hall.

one that brings us at loggerheads with the challenges posed or to be posed in future with the global capital taking over our assumed sacred identity. The debate, indeed, is meant to shed light on this sacredness of the criteria we generally take in building our identities. Yet, perhaps, we need to get down from our philosophical ivory tower and see what practical ways are there left for any option to think of citizenship in terms that would see it expand beyond the space/time compressed boundaries we generally erect for it.

In this respect, Taso Lagos – already mentioned above – raises a number of practical question that need elaborating upon albeit in ways that would make the notions of ‘citizen’ or ‘national’, or ‘subject’ easier to apprehend in this multipolar, multicultural world.

Lagos – himself a Greek immigrant in Seattle – sees the issue of citizenship as a question necessitating meticulous attention in an effort to define it. In his view ‘citizens should be distinguished from ‘nationals’ and from ‘subjects’ since the two latter require protection from the state, while citizenship status ‘is tied into the emergence of members of a polity with specific privileges and duties. To speak of ‘citizen’ is to speak of individuals which distinct relationships to the state, along with a social status and power these relations imply’ (Lagos, 2). This, at any rate, is the way citizenship has been passed on to us from ancient Greece and Rome, the Enlightenment and the American and French Revolution. (Lagos, 1) In his approach to the issue of citizenship, Lagos insists on the fact that it be looked at from a different light away from the legal ramifications of rights and duties since that would require that all countries of the world subscribe willingly to the same notion of Human Rights – a similar position shown by Held as we may see later. But Lagos insists on loosening the regulations so as to allow us to speak about global citizenry something he sees already happening as he makes it clear in the following:

Global citizenship is less defined by legal sanction than by ‘associational’ status that is different from national citizenship. Since there is no global bureaucracy to give sanction and protect global citizens, and despite intriguing models suggested by the EU, global citizenship remains the purview of individuals to live, work and play within trans-national norms and status that defy national boundaries and sovereignty. (Lagos, 4)

In fact, there are already people enjoying or undergoing this status of global citizenship – as the case may be; people who chose what country they wanted to work in, live or play in, and who felt not to be tied down to their land of birth. (Steenbergen, 1994)

If this were to be taken as a way of identifying the potential global citizens, Falk (1994) makes a five category list of actual global citizens which we give below:

- Global reformers;
- Elite global business people;

- Global environment managers;
- Politically conscious regionalists;
- Trans-national activists; (In Lagos, 6)

This list might be extended by adding to it another category that can already be described as global citizenry. Indeed, most double naturalised people (immigrants generally) can be described as global citizens given Lagos definition of it.

By overlooking the rigours to be imposed by any attempt to put citizenship in any legal framework, Lagos has been able to come up with practices he describes as akin to those of global citizens. He identifies tools such as the 'Internet, the cell phone, easy and cheap air travel and the wide use and acceptance of credit cards' (Lagos, 7) as factors helping to develop and facilitate communication between different global communities.

One final conclusion he draws is that given the state of things: 'there may emerge two tracks of citizenship: national and global, with the latter being more prestigious. Along with greater separation between the rich and the poor, educated and not, there would also be those relegated to living out their entire lives in one land, compared to those who freely travel to many'. (Lagos, 12) He pushes the provocation too far by insisting that 'global citizens may be so favoured that nations fight to attract them to their land, similar to today's fight for corporate sites'. (Lagos, 12)

As suggested in the previous paragraph, the notion of community as conceived under 'classical nation-state's' status, that is as bounded demos with commonalities, membership and a "we-consciousness" has become very much obsolete. It has to be understood that the type of community under focus is that described as a democratic practice. Similarly, the notion of citizenship, which is also subsequent to boundedness, the commonality becomes problematic in the sense that as an "exclusive community of citizens and as a bordered space, community is increasingly being put into question by the intensification of exchanges and interactions across borders" (Tambakaki 1). What all specialists on the question seem to agree about is that 'liberal democracy' which appears as the most viable form of government at present, despite the too many cracks that have appeared on the edifice of this notion as shown by testimonies to be brought below for the sake of illustration.

Specialists like David Held, Jurgen Habermas, John Rawls, Chantal Mouffe and so many others have acknowledged the crisis of liberal democracy, at least when conceived as a normative model (or the Old Athenian School). It is in a crisis due to its inadequacies and incapacity to cope with the rapid changes in the world community structures and economic exchanges. Such inadequacies, as addressed by Joseph Schumpeter as early 1947<sup>9</sup> when it was

<sup>9</sup> See J. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947.

understood socialist democracy / or mass democracy, then led to the inadequacy of popular sovereignty. Even in the present period such an egalitarian – at least in its normative classical model – still constitutes a threat for liberal democracy in the sense that any other populist ideologues could use the same channel to blow the democratic process from inside. Most of the theorists mentioned above, irrespective of their ideological bent are adamant that democracy need reshuffling to avoid scenarios like these.

In return the notion of deliberative democracy (DD) henceforth has come to occupy a primordial place in the writings of David Held (1999, 2004), Jürgen Habermas (1999, 2001) Rawls (1999, 2001), Seyla Benhabib (1996), and Joshua Cohen (1998) to name but these. Even Mouffe seems to agree with the view that normative liberal democracy need to be remedied to, although in her analysis of the theories propounded by each of the theorists mentioned above, she underlines some contradictions and obstacles to such a project. Indeed, her purpose is to help put it on solid grounds.

Before addressing the inadequacies Mouffe and the adversaries of deliberative democracy bring to the fore, it would be worthwhile to give a somewhat detailed description of the DD as seen by its advocates – albeit in a summative manner – for the sake of a better and fair argumentation. DD is based on the conception that members of the demos have the opportunity of accepting or rejecting their leaders thanks to a competitive electoral process (Mouffe, 1). This normative description of democracy does not exclude, however, the danger of falling into a mass democracy which would endanger the whole process of democratization. DD should enable the participants to make reasoned choices and preferences far from coercion of any manipulation. This would mean that popular participation should be discouraged since it could only have dysfunctional consequences for the working of the system. Proponents of the DD see that notion of ‘the common good’ and ‘general will’ are illusory and irrational. ‘Stability and order were more likely to result from a compromise among interests than from mobilizing people towards an illusory consensus on the common good’ (Mouffe, 2). They conduct their argumentation by first trying to establish a close link between liberal values and democracy; second they try to reach forms of agreements that would satisfy both rationality (understood as defense of liberal rights) and democratic legitimacy – as represented by popular sovereignty. In order to reach that state they have to reformulate the democratic principle in such a way as to eliminate the danger that it would pose for liberal values. Another interpretation of democratic sovereignty is given in inter-subjective terms and redefined as ‘communicatively generated power’ (Habermas in Mouffe, 4).

In the light of the views exposed above two main schools of DD are foregrounded: (a) John Rawls’ with his followers (Joshua Cohen); (b) Jürgen Habermas and his followers of whom Seyla Benhabib would be a major contributor in the current debate held in this work. Both aim at securing links

between democracy and liberalism; both reject the contradictions in liberal democracy. Rawls elaborated a democratic liberalism based on liberty and equality, a tradition very much associated with Locke who represents the Moderns, namely with their insistence on freedom of thought and conscience and the insurance of certain basic rights such as property and the rule of law. Habermas brings to the fore the originality of fundamental individual rights and the proper sovereignty. He talks also of self-government as a means to help protect individual rights, which in turn provide the necessary conditions to exercise popular rights. The followers of both, stress the following facts: (a) liberties of the "modern view" are not exterior to the democratic process and (b) that egalitarian liberal values are elements of democracy not constraints upon it. Both, however, agree that there should be a difference between mere agreement and rational consensus. This brings us to the crux of the matter which is the procedure for deliberation initiated by Habermas and elucidated by Benhabib in the following three major points which seem to be very convincing:

1. Participation in such deliberations should be based on equality and symmetry in the sense that all participants may initiate speech acts, question and interrogate or eventually open the debate.

2. The participants have right to question the assigned topics.

3. And the right to question the procedure and reverse pre-established rules for the setting up of the agenda, or the identity of the participants. (Mouffe, 4)

Benhabib, a staunch defender of Habermas, thinks the above criteria give legitimacy to the Democratic Institutions, because the people in authority (derived from this) are representing an impartial stand point which is equally in the interest of all (Mouffe, 4). Most of this process is bound by what she calls 'binding collective choices', generally giving a framework of laws and rules which guarantee conditions of free public reasoning among equals who are bound by the decisions taken. In light of this, the purpose would become one of finding the 'procedures that would guarantee moral impartiality' (Mouffe, 5). In fact, other issues that seem to bother the advocates of DD, essentially the procedures to follow to make a difference between a consensus reached rationally from one that is a mere argument. But they are adamant that - leaving aside existential issues (ethical, religious, moral and philosophical ones) - the framework, they are working out and which they are trying to refine, offers a good context to secure the required impartiality on public (Political) issues at least, equality, openness and lack of coercion. It will guarantee that deliberations are geared towards 'generalizable interests, which can be agreed upon by all participants thereby producing legitimate outcomes.' (Mouffe, 6)

The distinction, therefore, between existential issues (private issues for Cohen) and the public ones (for Benhabib) which are essentially political is

vital for the process of DD. The advocates acknowledge the necessity of the divide on the grounds that it is not guaranteed that some consensus will be reached on private issues as they depend on particularities. It appears that both proponents eliminate the possibility of having to deal with a private domain which is plural and would necessitate a plural framework which in turn subverts their notion of rational consensus.

In her final critique to the on-going debate between these theorists, Mouffe thinks that all contradictions brought forth testify to the fact that there is a fundamental tension between the logic of democracy and the logic of liberalism, a tension, she thinks that would never be resolved.' Carl Schmitt (1923), another contender, agrees on the 'ineradicability' of the tension although he claims that 'it can be negotiated in different ways' (Mouffe, 9). Mouffe offers also a safety-jacket by suggesting that 'democratic theory should renounce those forms of escapism and face the challenge that the recognition of the pluralism of values entails.' (Mouffe, 9).

A better assault on the DD is better achieved through the analysis of Tambakaki (2006) who takes in the theories of David Held and those of Mouffe in a comparison to show the shortcomings of the DD and why its adversaries are dissatisfied. To provide adequate grounds for a final analysis and verdict she proceeds first by discussing Held's theory, supported in her endeavor by her understanding of Mouffe's theory. This has enabled her to come up with some basic differences between the two, and eventually the shortcomings Mouffe's sees in Held's theory. This is what the present paper aims at elucidating. It also aims at showing how practical each of the views is.

One of the basic shortcomings, Mouffe underlines in Held's theory it that he relies too much on the notion of democratically bounded communities who would rally behind the notion of equality and liberty guaranteed by their adherence to the notion of Human Rights. This view is articulated around a pressing necessity as the world is going global. This is much better expressed in the following:

the fact that we live in and increasingly speak of a global community entails that we also participate in the affairs of this community as individuals who are interested in global developments and who are affected by global developments. We participate as cosmopolitan citizens, as individual citizens of the world--detached, by implication, from affective ties and attachments to particular communities. (Tambakaki 2006, 1)

The necessity to think of a global citizenry in a rather more urgent manner is shared by a number of theorists such as Archibugi and Habermas<sup>10</sup> to mention these two only. The fact that it is being debated here is not simply an exercise of erudite capabilities, it is also dictated by the urgency of the matter as people are struggling to cope with the ever changing economic, political, cultural

<sup>10</sup> See the works of J. Habermas on the issue 1996, 1999, 2001.

and ethnic maps. Several scenarios are being put on the table for discussion; Held's and Mouffe's are typical examples of this.

In her discussion, Tambakaki begins by showing the core of her antithetical drive, underpinned by her laying focus on the shortcomings of Held's theory which rests, according to her on a "deliberative and consensual understanding of democratic politics" (Tambakaki, 2). For a fair, equal and consensual deliberation to take place, the community has to be bounded, when it appears that "boundedness or boundary drawing becomes increasingly undermined by the intensification and multiplication of borders – transcending exchanges, interactions and networks (Tambakaki, 2). The notion of boundedness which seems fundamental to the notion of Held's community "rests on and presupposes collective identification and membership: who has a part, (...) and who does not, who participates in the affairs of the community, and who does not. They therefore presuppose boundaries or frontiers of some sort." (Tambakaki,3). The end result is a 'we-consciousness' – a collectivity – an 'us' which eventually and essentially distinguishes itself from a 'them'. In other words, a democratic practice which "involves relations of both inclusion and exclusion – defining who is part of the demos and who is not" (Tambakaki, 3). Such a conception entails necessarily exclusion, which is a root cause of antagonist attitudes.

Mouffe thinks that people would have to adhere to the same democratic ideas willingly to avoid exclusion of the said '*demos*'. Although she does not say this clearly, she also implies that if they refuse, they would have to be brought to reason by force if necessary. As a consequence, this would lead to the reinforcement of antagonism which would help set up the project of a cosmopolitan citizenship; something Mouffe is adamant about. One of the reasons advanced in support of such a rejection is that communities – which are pledging allegiance to various "Totems" will need an eternity to toe the line behind the same Human Rights that the United Nations is trying to enforce.

Tambakaki, who agrees with the same line of thought, seems to see in the views of Mouffe That agonistic attitudes are better suited for the project of a possible cosmopolitan citizenry. The "antagonistic" approach, she contends, fuels tensions, animosities and enmity; the "agonistic" one, in her view tames and controls differences and sees the 'other' as an adversary worthy of respect, rather than as an enemy.

Put very mildly, Mouffe seems to think that in a world bound to be multicultural, there has to be a judicial frame likely to absorb and accommodate all the differences. A very vivid example of the agonistic attitude could be very easily demonstrated by referring to the last electoral campaign when a staunch Republican lady talked to contender for the House McCane, meaning to see whether he held the same hostile attitude as she towards Barrack Obama. McCain chivalric attitude responded by saying "No madam, he (meaning Barrack Obama) is a gentleman with whom I seem to have different views

and solutions for different problems"<sup>11</sup> world that is plural requires a Frame that accommodates this plurality. This is what she explains in the following:

One of my ideas about how we can [make an agonistic struggle possible] is by multiplying us/them relations. Because the most likely condition for the emergence of antagonism ... is when there is very strong separation between 'us' and 'them'... If on the other hand, the us/them is multiplied, so that for instance you and I constitute an 'us' with respect to 'them', but then a different you and I constitute a different 'us' then it is less likely that there will be antagonism. This is a way to defuse the potential antagonism, which is present in the construction of collective identity. That is what I understand by multiplying passions. (Mouffe and Laclau, 2001: 26)

The passions she refers to in the above can only mean the different types of 'demos' she refers to when she says that:

The demos doesn't need to be the nation-state; that's important to understand ... There will be a plurality of forms of demos. Some lower than the state, some higher than the state. I think that's a way in which we can reintroduce meaning into democratic practice. By multiplying the forms of demos in which the citizen could exercise his/her rights of citizenship. But a demos is always implied --it could be the European Union, or it might be the region, but it can't be the world. (Mouffe and Laclau, 2001: 23)

But the demos she hankers for should never be conceived through 'the imposition of a single homogenizing model of society' (Tambakaki, 14). In the closing comments of her article Tambakaki stresses the fact that 'it is urgent that we imagine new forms of association in which pluralism would flourish and where the capacities for democratic decision making would be enhanced. (Tambakaki, 14)

We need perhaps to start by saying that systems theory - better known as Functional Differentiation - debated by specialists such as John Agnew,<sup>12</sup> and Oliver Kessler<sup>13</sup> is offering better insights into understanding how the world changing structure operates and connects. Indeed, this theory has further changed our understanding and conception of the 'imagined community' placing identification beyond the traditional drawn boundaries, or what these specialists call the *Territorial-trap*; described as being a logic where space is divided into an inside/outside frame. The following expresses the idea in much clearer terms:

This *inside-outside* logic inscribed in the concept of 'globalization' structures the space between regions in competitive terms. Here, *inside* of regions is described in social terms where the vocabulary of legitimacy, norms, rules, etc., can be applied. This *inside* is clearly separated from its anarchic *outside*. The idea to divide the globe into regional 'blocks of spaces' with *clear* geographical boundaries reproduces 'traditional' balance-of-power thinking. In the same vein, for example, cultures or societies are assumed to

<sup>11</sup> See a footage from ABC recently shown (16<sup>th</sup> February, 2009).

<sup>12</sup> See John A. Agnew, 2001.

<sup>13</sup> Oliver Kessler, 'Of Systems, Boundaries and Regionalisation', *Geopolitics*, Vol. 12 N:4 December 2007, pp. 570-580.

be structured along territorial boundaries. One can often hear the claim that 'Europe' belongs to a different 'culture' than Asia, or that, for example, Turkey is not a European state due to its geographical location or history. (Dietrich-Schultz, qtd in Kessler and Helmig, 573)

David-Schultz argues – along with Kessler and Helmig – that the logic of nation-state with fixed borders (the inside/outside logic) is an attempt which is still pervasive within discursive practices nowadays as it reproduces a traditional balance of power thinking. The assumption is meant to draw attention to the fact that this logic is in utter contradiction with the changing structure of world geography following the drive towards globalisation. This is, indeed, reinforced by the same authors' reference to the 'process of globalisation, regionalism and geopolitical fragmentation are exposing new challenges for geopolitics' (Kessler and Helmig, 573).

In other words, for a better approach to identity construction, there is an urgent need to create new tools and methods that take into consideration the ever-changing nature of boundary and culture determination. This is much better expressed in the following:

To circumvent the territorial trap, this contribution explores an avenue to regionalisation inspired by systems theory where the inside/outside distinction is recast as an internal differentiation of world society. This change of perspective has two repercussions: it highlights the social character of boundaries and includes ideas of social differentiation in the description of regionalisation processes. What is usually described as globalisation is now understood as resulting from an increasing functional differentiation of world society. (Kessler and Helmig, 571)

The view proposed by Schultz and supported by Kessler and Helmig, at least in theory, undermines our traditional notion of boundaries as it blows up the discursive metageographical borders of the traditional nation-state and opens them up on a global scale. So that now the only boundaries we have are those physical obstacles that prevent us from moving into other spaces where the frontier is sealed (as a result of political tension), or lack of means to move into other spaces (because without a plane or a ship, or some other means, one cannot cross the Atlantic to the USA). The theory also lays more focus on the social character of frontiers. This means that people from different backgrounds be they ideological or other may get together in some form of association and or an organization, quite often regional, breaking identity and ideological barriers; their social and economic interests being their prime motivations. Countries belonging to different regions may eventually gather where their social/economic interests are met, regardless of their ideological, ethnic or cultural make-up. The examples of functional differentiation offered in the article do give very serious instances of how certain social practices transgress the traditional territorial boundaries that we take for granted – something we will come to in detail below – 'Systems like law, economy, religion, sports, etc.' (Kessler and Helmig, 571) escape the traditional notion of territory to

'reconnect on a global level' offering thus a new dimension to world polity. (Kessler and Helmig, 571)

Notwithstanding the complication of international law, the 9/11 events have brought the world into a standstill. Too many countries have had to give in to the allied pressure and suspend their sovereignty claims if they had any until further notice – although it has to be admitted some did it for self-interest for fear they may undergo the ordeal of terrorist threats themselves. The US Department of State made several demands right and left for extraditions of suspected terrorists and or the pursuit of suspects into foreign territory. The age of prevention that has been amply discussed by law-makers has been replaced by a war of pre-emption very much on the agenda of the then incumbent Washington administration. For instance, the policing of American borders with Mexico has increased in the 1990s with the launching of Operation Gatekeeping,<sup>14</sup> but it has dramatically doubled in the wake of September 2001. These measures of containment were dimmed inefficient and were reinforced by others with the purpose of policing the undocumented immigration and the patrolling of the borders in general. A significant change brought up to these laws by the post-September 2001 regulations is the:

Change in US immigration enforcement concerning the border with Mexico – similar in many aspects to the US 'war on Drugs' – has been the physical projection of US immigration policing efforts abroad into source and transit countries for US-bound undocumented migration. In this sense, a complementary counterpart to the above inward-looking localisation of US immigration policing has been the outward extension of US immigration enforcement of spaces formally beyond the sovereign jurisdiction of the US. (Coleman, 16)

But we have to admit that although specialists tend to see post-September 2001 as the beginning of such an international cooperation to police borders in the area, records show this extension of law enforcement to neighboring countries to have been initiated earlier. Indeed, such cooperation:

Came about in the mid to late 1990s and in the context of a US-backed securitisation of migration issues through the Regional Conference on Migration (RCM), focused in large measure on coordinating efforts by member countries to combat migrant trafficking networks. In this general context of immigration policy convergence, the reach of the US immigration enforcement crept slowly Southwards. For example, Operation Global Reach – a Department Justice project headquartered in a new Immigration and Naturalisation Service (INS) general office in Mexico – established a permanent US immigration policing presence throughout Mexico and Central America in 1997. (Coleman, 16)

To stop the flows of immigrants, the same is happening between the governments of Morocco, Algeria and Libya and the European Union, the latter wanting to have early dikes to stop the waves of immigrants who flood the coast

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<sup>14</sup> See Methew Coleman, 2003.

of Spain and Italy; the first ramparts against this invasion. The North African governments who are used as a buffer zones request that they be compensated since they are also victims and don't want to add up these flocks into their own who also try their best to take the same chance. These efforts have been met with decision on the part of EU to create safe heavens in these countries to be able to screen and possibly send these hordes back to their home countries of origin. As a result, the EU is also putting a lot of money into that effort.<sup>15</sup> It has to be acknowledged, however, that Europe is not limiting itself to such deals, some real concrete walls – described as Integrated System of External Vigilance (ISEV)<sup>16</sup> – are being erected to protect Europe from such 'unauthorized' immigration.

In the same line of thought efforts by Interpol, around the world, are breaking through the thick layers of the different national Laws to bring criminals around the world to justice. As of late, several rings of drug cartels and criminals have been brought to justice through concerted efforts of police cooperation. The last example is the Bel Iraj case which sparked a wave of arrests between Morocco and Belgium. The same cooperation between police from Europe and Morocco has been behind the bringing of some suspected Islamists – supposed to have masterminded the 2003 bombing in Casablanca. Another ring made up of 96 suspects including officers in the police, the justice department and Custom officials have apparently been brought to Justice as a result of concerted efforts by Interpol.<sup>17</sup>

The last decade has also seen spectacular trials of state leaders by the International Criminal Court in the Hague – another concerted effort that transgresses the nation-state sovereignty in pursuit of 'justice'. One could indeed bring forth the trials of the Nuremberg Trials<sup>18</sup> of the German officers following the aftermath of the Nazi debacle that brought the end of World

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<sup>15</sup> 'Morocco has signed a readmission agreement with Spain that also covers transit migrants, but Moroccan authorities have generally only accepted the readmission of Moroccan nationals'. Jorgen Carling, "Unauthorised Migration from Africa to Spain", *International Migration* Vol. 45 (4) 2007

<sup>16</sup> See Jorgen Carling, "Unauthorised Migration from Africa to Spain", *International Migration* Vol. 45 (4) 2007.

<sup>17</sup> See all the Moroccan press of the late winter and early spring of 2009.

<sup>18</sup> After the war, some of those responsible for crimes committed during the Holocaust were brought to trial. Nuremberg, Germany, was chosen as a site for trials that took place in 1945 and 1946. Judges from the Allied powers -- Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States -- presided over the hearings of twenty-two major Nazi criminals. Twelve prominent Nazis were sentenced to death. Most of the defendants admitted to the crimes of which they were accused, although most claimed that they were simply following the orders of a higher authority. Those individuals directly involved in the killing received the most severe sentences. Other people who played key roles in the Holocaust, including high-level government officials, and business executives who used concentration camp inmates as forced laborers, received short prison sentences or no penalty at all. 2/18/2009 at <http://www.ushmm.org/outreach/wcrime.htm>

War II into a halt; but the case of Milosovich<sup>19</sup> and Charles Taylor<sup>20</sup> both of them charged with human genocides crimes at a time when it appears like a rule of thumb, not as an exception. The same fate has been faced by Saddam Hussein<sup>21</sup>, although the latter has been tried – assumedly by his own people – to avoid further exacerbating the bruised sentiment of the Arab; but everybody knows that the trial was monitored by the White House.

The last instance of this effort to argue for a cosmopolitanism of International Law is the case of Brussels now being a Temple of justice for most EU member states. In fact, practically speaking, most member states still enjoy some sovereignty at least as far as some international matters are concerned. But it seems that Brussels is taking the carpet from under their feet because it has the power to overturn rulings of some local courts. Cases, indeed, whereby civilians in Great Britain or elsewhere in Europe have lost cases in local courts, resorted to the Supreme Court in EU and won against their own government. It is true that too many people are scared of the long hand of The European Courts – and to some extent not just Europeans, if we take into consideration the cases mentioned above of heads of states being tried by the International Criminal Court (ICC). This form of Federalism takes away some of the sovereignty from them, a case that can explain the fear and resentment felt towards the Maastricht Treaty,<sup>22</sup> and later on the Lisbon and other similar Treaties to ratify the European Constitution. The results of the referenda in a number of European countries in the spring 2008 (Ireland for instance) as they voted against the ratification of the Constitution show the sheer fear Some Europeans have with regard to the loss of sovereignty. But it seems that countries are still joining the Union and will soon jump on the European band wagon.

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<sup>19</sup> The trial is being broadcast live on the Internet in Holland, Serbia, and the United States in English, Serbo-Croat and French at <http://www.un.org/icty>

<sup>20</sup> During his presidency, Taylor continued to battle insurgents who opposed his rule. He also reportedly began selling arms and other supplies to rebels in neighboring Sierra Leone. Taylor reportedly traded the weapons for diamonds. The rebels Taylor purportedly aided continued their war against the Sierra Leone government, conducting brutal sweeps through civilian areas, chopping off the arms, legs and noses of thousands of suspected government supporters, including women and children. On June 4, 2003, Taylor was indicted for war crimes by a United Nation's tribunal in Sierra Leone. See 'Liberia Uneasy Peace', 2/18/2009 at <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/africa/liberia/taylor-bio.html>

<sup>21</sup> Ousted Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein stands trial for atrocities that occurred under his reign. He faces the death penalty if convicted. 2/18/2009 at <http://www.courttv.com/trials/saddam/>

<sup>22</sup> The Maastricht Treaty (formally, the Treaty on European Union, TEU) was signed on 7 February 1992 in Maastricht, the Netherlands after final negotiations on December 9, 1991 between the members of the European Community and entered into force on 1 November 1993 during the Delors Commission. It created the European Union and led to the creation of the euro. The Maastricht Treaty has been amended to a degree by later treaties. 2/18/2009 [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty\\_on\\_European\\_Union](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_on_European_Union)

Like so many of the theorists mentioned above, the examples brought forth in relation to the Law – conceived as the most stumbling lock on the way to achieving a cosmopolitan citizenry – demonstrate that a move towards global citizenship is on the way and that it has already set up paths that are growing in leaps and bounds. As Lagos (2003) has suggested, it would not be a surprise to see adherence to this form of citizenry as a prestigious one and even as a coveted one in the future.

Kessler and Helmig, seems to suggest also that economy is another factor that is escaping entrapment with the traditional notion of territory – something they describe as the ‘territorial trap’. Gone are the days where car industries were the source of some national pride; over the three or four last decades, mergers – dictated by the necessity to stay competitive – have seen iconic car industries move into foreign hands. The merger of Honda with Austin Rover during the Thatcher government heralded a new era in the car industry. Hard pressed by the industrial actions and the pressure of labour movements, some national businesses move away into countries where labour is cheap and where labour movements are inexistent. They also do it to stay competitive, despite the opposition they have to face up to by some NGOs and environmental activists (Lagos, 2003).

Suffice it to say that the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)<sup>23</sup>, now defunct and replaced by a more robust WTO, date back to 1947 two years after World War II and that since then, it has endeavoured to regulate trade between countries in the world and mostly between member states. What is remarkable is that countries once hostile to the organisation are now queuing up to subscribe to it. The fear to be left behind, and mostly after the euphoria

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<sup>23</sup> The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (typically abbreviated ‘GATT’) was the outcome of the failure of negotiating governments to create the International Trade Organization (ITO). GATT was formed in 1947 and lasted until 1994, when it was replaced by the World Trade Organization. The Bretton Woods Conference had introduced the idea for an organization to regulate trade as part of a larger plan for economic recovery after World War II. As governments negotiated the ITO, 15 negotiating states began parallel negotiations for the GATT as a way to attain early tariff reductions. Once the ITO failed in 1950, only the GATT agreement was left. The GATT’s main objective was the reduction of barriers to international trade. This was achieved through the reduction of tariff barriers, quantitative restrictions and subsidies on trade through a series of agreements. The GATT was a treaty, not an organization. The functions of the GATT were taken over by the World Trade Organization which was established during the final round of negotiations in early 1990s. The history of the GATT can be divided into three phases: the first, from 1947 until the Torquay Round, largely concerned which commodities would be covered by the agreement and freezing existing tariff levels. A second phase, encompassing three rounds, from 1959 to 1979, focused on reducing tariffs. The third phase, consisting only of the Uruguay Round from 1986 to 1994, extended the agreement fully to new areas such as intellectual property, services, capital, and agriculture. Out of this round the WTO was born. GATT signatories occasionally negotiated new trade agreements that all countries would enter into. Each set of agreements was called a *round*. In general, each agreement bound members to reduce certain tariffs. Usually this would include many special-case treatments of individual products, with exceptions or modifications for each country.

relished as a conviction that the market economy is the last ditch of history, to use Fukuyama's<sup>24</sup> phrase for it. It is not clear yet how the last financial crisis is going to shake the confidence of new comers to the club if ever it does, but unless some pattern has become clear to show the shaking of this trust, it seems that it will continue in the same way unabated. Too much effort has been vested into going market free through privatisation policies to opt, now, for some unknown system. What all this spells out is a constant drive towards a global economy.

Critics see in the globalisation drive a factor that has fragilized the boundaries but agree nevertheless on the predatory nature of it – spearheaded by multinationals the globalisation has bracketed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of nations – even the most powerful ones as the case may be with the USA, Great Britain, Germany, France, etc. For instance whose internal markets fell into the hands of Asian businesses. It is true that nations have weakened at the expense of corporate business whose budget as given by statistics show that they surpass that of certain states.<sup>25</sup> It is also true, corporate businesses have the money, but they still need territory and therefore would, for some time to come, still feel the pressure of nation-state protection and legislature. Nevertheless, it would not serve any purpose to fake the truth and pretend that globalisation is not making inroads into territories in a sense that erodes nation-state sovereignty.

In practice, however, one is bound to admit the crossing of boundaries has and is always in favor of the powerful nations as the following critique from Derrida clarifies in the ten item list he issued to show the discrepancy and the contradiction at the heart of the global drive. Item two (2) of the list, indeed, stipulates that among the ten plagues of the capital global system is the “deportation of immigrants; reinforcement of territories in a world of supposed freedom of movement. As in, Fortress Europe and in the number of new Separation barriers being erected around the world, in effect multiplying the “fallen” Berlin Wall manifold.”<sup>26</sup> It has to be underlined, though that Derrida's and so many other assaults were targeted at the euphoria felt by the proponents of the supremacy of Market economy following the demise of the socialist and the Fall of the Berlin Wall.<sup>27</sup> In his *Specters of Marx*, he makes an

allusion to Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels' statement at the beginning of the Communist Manifesto that a “spectre [is] haunting Europe.” For Derrida, the spirit of Marx

<sup>24</sup> See Francis Fukuyama, *The end of History and the Last Man*, New York: Penguin, 1992.

<sup>25</sup> See article on the Australian Labour Party.

<sup>26</sup> The *Spectres of Marx*, 9<sup>th</sup> February, 2009, at [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Specters\\_of\\_Marx](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Specters_of_Marx)

<sup>27</sup> Derrida's virulent attack comes at a time when Fukuyama's *End of History* has made the news heralding the euphoria felt by the partisans of Market Economy.

is even more relevant now since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the demise of communism. With its death the spectre of communism begins to make visits on the earth. Derrida seeks to do the work of inheriting from Marx, that is, not communism, but of the philosophy of responsibility, and of Marx's spirit of radical critique. Derrida first notes that, in the wake of the fall of communism, many in the west had become triumphalist, as is evidenced in the formation of a Neo-con grouping and the displacement of the left in third way political formations.<sup>28</sup>

Other similar attacks to be fair to the critiques focus mostly on the failure of Market economy and the drive to globalize the world to bring equity by ensuring an equitable division of the wealth and chances among all the countries of the world. The following critique can be further enhanced in the arguments level by Francis B. Nyamnjoh in his article where he labored hard to show the discrepancies caused by the drive of the global drive in terms of mobility and wealth benefits.<sup>29</sup>

This glorification of multinational capital is having untold consequences, especially in marginal sites of accumulation where devalued labour is far in excess of cautious capital. The accelerated flows of capital, goods, electronic information and migration induced by globalisation have only exacerbated insecurities, uncertainties and anxieties in locals and foreigners alike. In their wake has come about an even greater obsession with citizenship, belonging, and the building or re-actualisation of boundaries and differences through xenophobia and related intolerances. The response almost everywhere, is for states to tighten immigration regulations, and for local attitudes towards foreigners and outsiders to harden. Where migrants are welcome, interest in having them tends to be limited to those with skills or capital to invest in the local economy. When unskilled migrants are reluctantly accepted, they have to be ready to go for the menial jobs for which even the most destitute nationals would seldom settle. Skilled or unskilled, immigrants tend to be exploited and treated as 'slave labour' or 'sleepwalkers' by employers keen to 'take advantage of their precarious state to drive down wages and circumvent labour laws' (cf. Dieux 2002).

But we have to admit that the concern of these critiques is to point out the defects and inequalities of the drive of the global capital – which is a legitimate call – when in the present paper the basic drive is to show how identity politics is affected by the recent changes.

FD theory, indeed, lays more focus on the social character of frontiers to exacerbate further our notion of ideology, ethnicity and barriers such as these. For the FD theorists, it has become customary to form groupings based on criteria other than ideology, ethnicity and or identity whatever that meant. The examples brought forth in the folds of this section will show that the driving motto between these associations or regional groupings tends to be the social and /or economic interests rather than anything else.

<sup>28</sup> *The Spectres of Marx*, Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> See Francis B. Nyamnjoh, "Globalisation, Boundaries and Livelihood: Perspectives on Africa", in: *Identity, Culture and Politics*, vol. 5, Ns 1 & 2, 2004, pp. 37-59, Codesria & ICES, 2004.

The view that in politics, communities may ally around the same political notion and defend it or try to promote it regardless of what territoriality they are included in, has become a reality. A better example of this is the Shengen Space. On the other hand, political affinities between communities are not a phenomenon of the present. History abounds in examples of trans-territorial alliances due to political or ideological lines. Tribal gatherings have always been achieved following principles of interest common to two or more tribes.<sup>30</sup> Modern societies and communities have also constructed alliances along similar lines of interest. But perhaps no other period in the history of mankind has seen similar alliances for ideological, political and economic interests than 20<sup>th</sup> century. The world has split up along pure ideological lines into East/West; North/South or in clear terms, Marxist, socialist or Communist as opposed to Capitalist or pro-capitalist countries. With the fall of the Berlin wall, the coming of the Perestroika, the end of the Cold War and mostly, the advent of Multiculturalism, ideological alliances have become very obsolete marks of differentiation between people and communities; reference here should be made to a large number of literature written on the topic namely the famous and controversial book – initially an article – by S. Huntington on *The Clash of Civilizations*, or even to Fukuyama's *End of History* and related articles. Although one may object to the fact that Huntington's divorces religion from ideology something that is highly questionable, but serving his "ideological" and political agenda.

Territorial transgression may indeed be effected in so many different ways and by so many different factors. For the sake of illustration, Kessler and Helmig ponder over two of these, namely, sports and religion as two determinant factors in cultural and national identity.<sup>31</sup> Sports, as a matter of fact, offers a staggering example of Functional Differentiation that overlooks territorial boundaries. In Europe, for instance, Sports Federations include countries like Turkey and Israel which are not member states in the European Union. These federations have bypassed the political status to allow for the inclusion of both Turkey and Israel. Turkish and Israeli teams do compete within the European Federations. On the other hand, national teams which were traditionally selected along ethnic and national criteria, have as of late rendered these criteria very much obsolete.<sup>32</sup> Nations around the world have allowed

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<sup>30</sup> See Dunn Ross, *Resistance in the Desert: Moroccan Response to French Imperialism 1881-1912*, London: Croom Helm – University of Wisconsin Press, 1977.

<sup>31</sup> For further information on the issue, see Oliver Kessler, Oliver Kessler, 'Of Systems, Boundaries and Regionalisation', *Geopolitics*, vol. 12, N:4 December 2007, p. 571.

<sup>32</sup> Opponents of Turkey's membership in the EU use exactly this geography-cum-culture argument that assumes cultures can be clearly divided along geographical borders... it is noteworthy, how fuzzy the 'cultural boundary between Europe and Turkey actually is. If we consider sports and art as two aspects of our culture', then one has to realize that Turkey is a participant of the 'European' Vision Song Contest and along with several other non-EU countries,

naturalised players to represent them; the Tunisian Football federation has allowed a couple of Brazilian players to nationally represent them. The French and British national teams are also good examples of this. Sometimes, several states contest the right to be represented by the same player. The case of Moroccan players playing for Holland is edifying.<sup>33</sup>

In the same line of thought, Religion can also be a factor allowing functional differentiation as it is able to transgress boundaries be they geographic, ethnic, political and conceptual. Traditionally, religion has been associated with ethnicity, culture, and language – most of which are criteria confined within certain geographic areas. Hence Christianity was confined within specific territories historically known for their belonging to Christians or those converted through evangelising campaigns during the exploration and colonising periods. Similarly, Islam was also confined to certain geographical spaces or those that have undergone conversion during the period of the Islamic advent or even after. Traditionally, such criteria have allowed communities of any of these religious denominations – but not limited to these – to enjoy certain complacency offered by a somewhat ethnic and cultural affinity. Presently, however, such demarcations are not tenable any more as both Christianity and Islam are making arrays into each others territories with a somewhat bigger advantage to the latter – at least according to some statistics provided by CAIR<sup>34</sup> whereby it is assumed that Islam is making headways into the heart of America and Europe. Another subversion of such denomination is offered by the fact that the domination enjoyed by Protestant denominations in USA, for instance, is being subverted by the masses of Latin asylum seekers<sup>35</sup>.

Even the language factor, so much associated with these religious doctrines is fading away as it is being replaced by other languages like English,

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a member in the European Football Association Glatasaray Istanbul is a frequent competitor in the European Champions League just as Spartak Moscow of Maccabi Haifa, two other football clubs located beyond European borders but certainly part of this 'culture and even subject to 'European' regulations. (Kessler and Helmig, 2007, pp. 579-580).

<sup>33</sup> Some Moroccan national football players, who have been naturalised Dutch as well, have been coveted by both Football Federations; the Moroccan and the Dutch. The three players in question are Mr Affelay, Mr. El Bekkal and Mr. Boulahrouz. They decided to side with the Dutch to the disappointment of the Moroccans.

<sup>34</sup> CAIR are acronyms for 'Council for American Islamic Affairs'. At [http://www.cair-net.org/mosquereport/Masjid\\_Study\\_Project\\_2000\\_Report.pdf](http://www.cair-net.org/mosquereport/Masjid_Study_Project_2000_Report.pdf). 7th July, 2008.

<sup>35</sup> See Jim Sleeper's work 'Review of Huntington's *Who We Are?; The Challenge to America's National Identity*' where he states the following: "He opens *Who Are We?* by admitting he's too close to our crisis of American identity to address it only as a scholar; he's writing also as a patriot to defend a distinctive "Anglo-Protestant" political culture, which he believes is indispensable to republican self-governance here. Anyone of any race or ethnic background can join this "nonracial society composed of multiracial individuals", but only after having absorbed and adapted – or been absorbed into – the enduringly Anglo-Protestant idiom and ethos that most Americans of all colors and ethnicities do share but which, he says, most Latino immigrants resist." <http://hnn.us/articles/4987.html>. (3 July, 2008).

French and Spanish or Arabic in certain cases. These languages have indeed fought their way through religious practices of each of these theologies. Both Arabic and English have found their way to British space through the dominant Pakistani immigrants Muslim communities. These do their prayers in Arabic but converse about Muslim theology in English. This situation is further enhanced by the existence of other Muslim communities in the UK who do not speak Urdu, but who can speak both Arabic, during prayer time, and English when discussing theology. What has been said about English/ Arabic dual usage can also be said about French/ Arabic in both France and Belgium where large communities of Muslims both Arab and Africans live.<sup>36</sup> It is also true that other European languages – like German and Swedish to quote but these two – are following suit, but their impact is minimal and will probably be so even in the remote future. Over and above, we may say that as converts are also being made on either side of the religious spectrum, the ethnic, linguistic and geographic criteria has ceased to be edifying.

It has now become obvious following the arguments raised above by Functional Differentiation theorists that: (1) traditional territorial divisions have, recently, proved to be obsolete and inaccurate even in case of identity construction; (2) territorial as well as any other form of boundaries have always been transient depending as they are on their functionality. As long as they prove doable, they allow national and regional, commercial gathering; but when the run out of juice, the centres are shifted into yet other spaces with new boundaries, creating thus new communities with new interests which prove to be more functional than the preceding ones; (3) by being so transient and so ephemeral, they lead to very disturbing enquiries about notions of sovereignty, and more pertinently, identity construction that “imagined communities” get engaged in.

Questions raised by these systems theories advocates are disturbing but to some degree realistic and legitimate to ask as they debunk our complacencies such as that of associating Islam with Arabity, or that of associating Frenchness with descent from the “Gaulois” ancestry to quote but these two examples. Indeed, what is to be French if ex-colonised Africans may come up with legislation which could affect authentic French citizenry? What is to be French when the football national team of France is made up of 90% of black Africans or player originating from ex-colonies. Such questions remind us that we need constant adjusting to norms of space, culture, identity that have become so volatile that they keep changing at a very fast space in an age of fast developing communication and technology.

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<sup>36</sup> No study has been conducted on the phenomenon yet, at least to my knowledge. These are personal impressions gathered during my stays (a) in Glasgow, Scotland (1985-1988 and 1993); (b) in Louvain La Neuve, Belgium (1998).

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